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I. INTRODUCTION
After the Washington State Supreme Court recently held
that Washington did not follow the "risk capital" concept of
securities,' the legislature responded by unequivocally defining
the term "security" to include risk capital.2 In so doing, Wash-
ington became the seventh western state3 to espouse the risk
capital theory, which originated in the California courts' and has
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1. Sauve v. K.C., Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 698, 591 P.2d 1207 (1979). The supreme court,
after stating that Washington did not follow the risk capital test, defined the test as"requir[ing] only that risk capital be supplied with a reasonable expectation of a valua-
ble benefit but without the right to control the enterprise." Id. at 702, 591 P.2d at 1209.
The leading case in the area is Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361
P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). See also Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Secur-
ity": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 367 (1967); Hannan &
Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities,
25 HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974); Comment, The Definition of a Security Under the California
Corporate Securities Law of 1968: The Risk Capital Test, 6 PAC. L.J. 683 (1975).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12) (1979). The sole legislative history consists of a
transcript relating to a point of inquiry on the floor:
Point of Inquiry
Senator Clarke: "Senator, is it your understanding that the purpose of the
House amendment is to establish the risk capital definition as a part of the
Washington law in view of the recent Washington Supreme Court case of Sauve
v. K.C. Inc. reported in 91 Wn. 2d 698 which held that the current law does not
include that definition?"
Senator Bausch: "Yes, the amendment does establish the risk capital definition
as a part of the Washington State Law."
1979 WASH. SENATE J. 1688.
3. In the Ninth Circuit, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon also
follow the risk capital theory. See text accompanying notes 40-73 infra.
4. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr.
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the endorsement of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 The
theory developed in response to shortcomings in the federal
interpretation of an "investment contract" security, particularly
the requirements of investor nonparticipation and profit expecta-
tion.' Thus, the Washington Legislature expanded the applicabili-
ty of the securities act to reach financing schemes that heretofore
were unregulated. Despite the benefit to investors of broader
protection, the risk capital theory is not without its critics.7 It
complicates existing law and requires flexibility in interpretation
and application. To understand and apply the theory, it is
desirable to review the evolution of the investment contract
concept under the securities acts.' Viewing risk capital in the light
186 (1961). Some commentators indicate that Silver Hills may not have been the first
decision based upon the risk capital approach. See Coffey, supra note 1, at 381-82; Long,
An Attempt To Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regula-
tion, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135, 168-70 (1971).
5. El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 900 (1974).
6. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Washington State Securities Act have as a
prerequisite to their application the finding of a "security." See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d
(1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1979). Because the Washington Act sets forth a
specific list of instruments classified as securities, WAsH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12)
(1979), many promoters have attempted to devise arrangements which would keep them
outside the scope of the act. A court's primary tool for curtailing evasion of the law is
classification of a scheme as an "investment contract," the most indefinite category
under the definition of "security." Thus, refinement of the investment contract defini-
tion necessarily restricts its applicability, reducing a court's authority to bring novel
arrangements within the ambit of the securities acts.
7.
The major problem with the risk-capital theory of Silver Hills is that the
court never adequately defined what it meant by "risk-capital." It could mean
(1) capital used to promote a previously nonexistent project, (2) capital
invested in a risky chance or venture, or (3) capital with a very risky chance of
return ...
Risk-capital has been criticized as being too subjective a concept. Some
commentators have suggested that acceptance of this theory would necessitate a
day-by-day evaluation of an enterprise to determine whether enough risk existed
to classify the investment as a security. . . . Other criticisms are that the
theory's emphasis on risky ventures would seriously impede the necessary flow of
capital to innovative enterprises, and that abuses can occur in the most solidly
established corporations.
Securities Regulation, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 815, 822 n.28 (citations omitted). For further
discussion of risk capital, see text accompanying notes 141-65 infra.
8. In 1959, Washington enacted the Uniform Securities Act, which included "in-
vestment contract" among the subcategories of the definition of security. Securities Act of
Washington, ch. 282, § 60(11), 1959 Wash. Laws 1350 (codified at WAsH. REv. CODE §
21.20.005(12) (1979)). The definition section of the Uniform Act was derived in turn from
the federal Securities Act of 1933. UNIFORM SECURrrIIs Acr § 401(1), Commissioners' note
(amended 1958). The 1933 Act purported to define the term "security" by enumerating a
long list of instruments traditionally called securities and adding the "investment con-
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of that evolution, one can more accurately predict the Washington
courts' new answer to the old question, "What is a security?"
The purpose of this article is to guide practitioners and
jurists in understanding this complex area of the law as applied
in Washington. The most notable developments in the federal
law dealing with investment contract securities, particularly as
the Washington courts interpreted them, and the development of
the risk capital theory in other jurisdictions are explored for the
purpose of understanding what the Washington Legislature
intended by its definition. To this end, this article examines the
various elements of the new risk capital definition. The conclu-
sion indicates areas in which the definition might apply and sug-
gests practical steps a careful practitioner might follow in
response to this new aspect of securities law in Washington.
I. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT
CONTRACT
A. Pre-Howey Interpretations of "Security"
The first comprehensive attempt to define the term "secur-
ity" was in the federal legislation enacted during the early
1930's. The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934'0 defined "security" by use of nonexclusive lists of
instruments commonly considered securities, such as stocks,
bonds, and debentures. Although generally descriptive of securi-
ties, it was never clear how or why these instruments were secur-
ities or whether they were always securities. In addition, inclu-
sion of the broader but less descriptive term "investment
contract" complicated the lists." Thus the task of defining
tract," the origin of which is largely unknown. According to Professor Mofsky, the term
"investment contract" first appeared in a statutory definition of security in the Minnesota
Blue Sky Law of 1917. Mofsky, The Expanding Definition of "Security" Under the Blue
Sky Laws, 2 SEC. REG. L.J. 217, 218 n.2 (1973). Congress left the scope of the term open
to judicial interpretation. Note, Securities Regulation-United Housing Foundation, Inc.
v. Forman: The Supreme Court Refines the Howey Formula, 54 N.C.L. REv. 731, 732
(1976). Much interpretive effort has focused on the elusive investment contract. On no
less than seven occasions, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the meaning
of investment contract, the most famous of the decisions being SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
9. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 2, 48 Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(1976)).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 3, 48 Stat. 882 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 78c (1976)).
11. For the purposes of this article, the definitions contained in the 1933 Securities
and 1934 Securities Exchange Acts will be treated as equivalent. The 1934 Act definition
.851979]
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exactly what Congress meant by the term "security" and, most
importantly, by the term "investment contract," fell to the
courts.
The United States Supreme Court's first opportunity to
define the scope of the term "investment contract" as used in
the Securities Act of 1933 came in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp. 12 To finance the drilling of a test well on his Texas prop-
erty, an oil promoter sold subleaseholds on several adjacent
parcels. The subleases would greatly appreciate in value if the
promoter struck oil in his test well. In this first encounter with the
term "investment contract," the Court emphasized the functional
and policy aspects of the transaction and looked to whether the
scheme presented the abuses addressed by the securities acts. In
finding the subleases to be securities, the Court did not define
"investment contract," choosing rather to base its holding on the
belief that Congress intended the securities acts to be flexible."3
This substance-over-form approach allowed the Court to include
within the scope of the securities laws any device that those laws
is:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preor-
ganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1976). The term "investment contract" is perhaps the least clearly
understood term in the definition of a security. As such, it has become a catchall phrase
to snare the schemes which regulators feel should come within the ambit of the securities
acts but which do not fit neatly into one of the more commonly recognized subcategories.
Sirva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC,
387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1967).
12. 320 U.S. 344 (1943). Justice Murphy indicated that the Joiner Court was adopt-
ing a definition first announced in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56,
177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920). 320 U.S. at 349. For a survey of relevant federal and state cases
preceding Joiner, see Long, supra note 4.
13.
[Tihe reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace.
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also
reached if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt
in under terms or courses of dealing which established their character in com-
merce as "investment contracts," or as "any instrument commonly known as a
security."
320 U.S. at 351.
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were intended to reach, but placed the Court in the position of
proceeding on a case-by-case basis. No clear definition of an
investment contract was apparent.
B. The Howey Test
Within three years of the Joiner decision, the Court, in SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co.,' 4 again addressed the scope of the term
"investment contract." The W.J. Howey Co., a Florida corpora-
tion, was engaged in a program to sell interests in orange groves
coupled with an optional service contract. Under the optional
service contract, the seller's affiliate, the Howey-in-the-Hills Ser-
vice Corporation, maintained and harvested the orange trees and
shared the profits of the grove with the investor-purchasers.
Most of the purchasers were nonresidents of Florida who lacked
the knowledge, skill, and equipment necessary for the care and
harvest of the trees, but who nevertheless were attracted to the
scheme by the expectation of profits.
Determining that the sales scheme involved a security, the
Court set down its now classic definition that a security is pre-
sent whenever "the scheme involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others."'" The test is usually broken down into four compo-
nents: 6 (1) an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise
(3) with an expectation of profits (4) to come solely from the
efforts of others. The Court, while warning lower courts of the
problems that might arise through a mechanistic application of
this test, indicated that the test permitted "fulfillment of the
statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure."' 7
Subsequent federal cases have substantially refined the
Howey test." Some lower courts, ignoring the Court's admoni-
tion in Howey, have applied the test inflexibly. 9 Others have
14. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
15. Id. at 301.
16. In some cases the third and fourth elements are combined. See, e.g., SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
17. 328 U.S. at 299-301. The Court also warned that "[the statutory policy of
affording broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant
formulae." Id. at 301. See 1 L. Loss, SEcuarrIEs REGULATION 491 (2d ed. 1961).
18. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479-83 (5th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973).
19. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973),
rev'd, 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). For an inept analysis, see Commonwealth ex rel. Pa.
Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964).
19791
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avoided dogmatic application of the test principally by expan-
sive use of the term "profit" and by elimination of the fourth
requirement that the profits come solely from the efforts of
others. 20 Until 1975, the Court, although continuing to cite the
Howey case as controlling,"' did not reconsider the basic
problems raised by the case or clarify the language it used. As a
result, state and lower federal courts were left with the task of
interpreting Howey.
C. The Forman Test
In 1975, United Housing Foundation v. Forman22 reached
the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs were residents of a New York
low-cost housing cooperative. The housing project was built
largely with funds procured under the New York Private Housing
Finance Law, known as the Mitchell-Lama Act.2 3 Under the act,
the state of New York provided private developers with long-
term, low-interest loans and special tax exemptions to build
housing cooperatives to be operated on a nonprofit basis. United
Housing Foundation, a nonprofit organization, financed con-
struction of the project partly through sales of "stock" in the
cooperative. To acquire an apartment, each prospective tenant
had to purchase an amount of stock based upon the number of
rooms acquired. The stock was severely restricted; there was no
possibility of capital appreciation because stock could only be
sold to current tenants and had to be tendered to the cooperative
or an approved prospective tenant at cost. Further, the shares
could not be pledged or encumbered and would descend, along
with the apartment, only to a surviving spouse. The tenant
plaintiffs sued United Housing Foundation after unanticipated
construction costs caused the actual monthly rental charges to
escalate over seventy percent above the projected rental charges.
20. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973); accord, McCowan v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 209 (10th Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Georgia Mkt. Centers, Inc.
v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52
Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). See generally D.M.C. of Colo., Inc. v. Hays, [1954-1971
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 70,897 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971).
21. United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC
v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65, 72 (1959).
22. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
23. Ch. 803, 1961 N.Y. Laws 2164 (current version at N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW §§
1-908 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1978)).
[Vol. 3:83
Risk Capital Security
The Forman Court held that the shares issued with the
apartments were not securities either as stock or as investment
contracts. The Court rejected the claim that there was an in-
vestment contract security because the transaction lacked a key
element of the Howey test-expectation of profit. The Court
indicated that a profit expectation sufficient to satisfy the Howey
requirement may arise through capital appreciation, through
participation in earnings, or perhaps income to be yielded on
investment. However, the Court apparently rejected two of the
three indicia of profit the Second Circuit Court of Appeals used
to find a security-tax benefits and discounts-because the coop-
erative did not represent these benefits as profits, nor would the
tenants obtain them through the efforts of the cooperative or
third parties. The Court did admit that the circuit court's third
indication of profit, income from commercial leases for the con-
venience facilities in the cooperative, "is the kind of profit tradi-
tionally associated with a security investment."'2' In this particu-
lar setting, however, the Court found this income "far too
speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction
within the Securities Act. '2 5
The Forman Court's cautious definition of profits places lim-
its on the Howey test beyond which the Court cannot be
expected to go without evidence of strong investment representa-
tions. The added requirement that a significant, realistic expec-
tation of profit or income that will motivate investors to risk
their capital, tends to exclude schemes that attract consumers
rather than investors. Persons who purchase an interest with the
intent of personal consumption do not at the same time, the For-
man Court implied, expect to realize Howey-type profit. 2 This
conclusion is consistent with the facts in Forman where a ten-
ant's stock could not appreciate or provide a profit-like return,
but does not seem to apply very broadly. Unlike the facts in For-
man, many interests sold to consumers will show capital appreci-
ation upon resale regardless of use during ownership.27 If the
appreciation results from the enterprise efforts of third parties, a
security may still be found. Two points emerge, therefore, from
the "profits" discussion in Forman: (1) the purchase of the inter-
24. 421 U.S. at 856.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 852-53.
27. Id. at 853 n.17. See, e.g., Lowery v. Ford Hill Inv. Co., 192 Colo. 125, 556 P.2d
1201 (1976). Time-sharing interests and club memberships are possible examples.
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est must be induced by the expectation of substantial economic
gain, and (2) the purchase must be primarily for investment as
opposed to personal occupancy or consumption.
In a further move, the Forman Court rewrote two of the
Howey requirements: "solely from the efforts of others" and"common enterprise." The Forman Court restated the Howey
test as follows: "The touch stone is the presence of an invest-
ment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation
of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others." 8 Unlike the Forman Court's conservative posi-
tion on profits, these changes appear to broaden the investment
contract test.
A literal application of the "solely from the efforts of others"
requirement of Howey would result in a finding that no invest-
ment contract exists if investors are asked to perform even a
token effort. By leaving out the word "solely," the Forman Court
apparently changed that test to profits derived from the "essen-
tial managerial efforts of others." As a consequence, token inves-
tor effort or nonmanagement investor participation will not
preclude finding an investment contract. The Court seemingly
approved the erosion of the "solely" test that had occurred pri-
marily in cases involving pyramid schemes or franchises,2
thereby acknowledging that in many cases the investor may be
required to make some genuine effort in behalf of the enterprise
yet still lack control over the management of his investment. 0 As
a result of this change, the "profits through the efforts of others"
test is largely a factual question that will require courts to deter-
mine the degree of management participation and control by
investors in order to decide whether a particular transaction
involves a security.
The Forman Court also substituted the term "common ven-
ture" for "common enterprise." What effect, if any, this substi-
tution will have is not yet clear, although two inferences are pos-
sible. First, to find an investment contract, the Third and
28. 421 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added).
29. In these cases the investor may be required to make some genuine effort on
behalf of the enterprise, yet the investor still lacks control over the management of his
investment. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
30. 421 U.S. at 852 n.16 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474 F.2d 476, 482
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973)). See, e.g., Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th
Cir. 1979) (raising earthworms); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414
(8th Cir. 1974) (breeding chinchillas).
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Seventh Circuits require a common enterprise among investors.3'
Other circuits that have considered the question of common
enterprise, including the Ninth Circuit, find this element satis-
fied if there is an enterprise between the investor and promoter.32
By altering the language from "common enterprise" to "common
venture," the Supreme Court may have indicated that it does
not intend to be held to a narrow interpretation. Second, as
speculative as it may seem, the use of the term "venture" may
signify that the Supreme Court is moving closer to adopting
some aspects of the risk capital concept. The term "venture"
connotes raising venture capital and frequently has been used by
those courts that have applied the risk capital test.3 3 Use of"venture" may well demonstrate the Supreme Court's flexibility
and willingness to move away from a rigid application of Howey
to more closely align itself with the risk capital approach. While
the Court declined to adopt this test under the facts in Forman,
footnote twenty-four of the opinion suggests that the Court is not
foreclosing future consideration of risk capital as an alternative
to the Howey test. 4
D. The Daniel Case
Following Forman, the Supreme Court, in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,35 reviewed an employee's
interest in a compulsory, noncontributory, fixed-benefit pension
31. See, e.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-78 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066,
1068 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1973). Both Milnarik and Was-
nowic involved discretionary commodities trading accounts.
32. A majority of the circuits view the degree of control the promoter exercises over
the enterprise as the key factor. Focusing the inquiry on the efforts of others arguably
eliminates the element of common enterprise from the Howey test. See SEC v. Continen-
tal Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Asso-
ciated Underwriters, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 168, 178-79 (D. Utah 1975); Rochkind v. Reynolds
Sec., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254, 257 (D. Md. 1975).
33. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13
Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105
(1971); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Syss., Inc., 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549
(1971).
34. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24. This would seem to follow if the risk capital test includes
some expectation of profit. See, e.g., Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, Inc., 583
F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978); Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976);
El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900
(1974).
35. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
1979]
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plan. Daniel, a Chicago truck driver, worked continuously for
approximately twenty-three years except for a four-month invol-
untary layoff. Throughout Daniel's employment, in accordance
with a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement, his em-
ployer contributed to a pension plan trust fund. Contributions to
the fund were not measured by an employer's obligation to any
individual employee. Upon retirement in 1973, Daniel discovered
that to receive benefits the pension plan required twenty years
continuous employment, which he failed to satisfy because of the
four-month period of unemployment.
The Court, reversing the decisions below,3 6 held that the
pension interest was not a security because Daniel had not
invested money or its equivalent and there was insufficient
expectation of profit under the investment contract test. The
Court found that Daniel's labor was exchanged primarily for sal-
ary and could not be allocated to constitute investment consider-
ation.3 7 Additionally, the Court held that although Daniel might
in some sense expect "profits" from a pension plan, his partici-
pation in any profit was insubstantial and speculative. 8 The
Daniel case did not alter the Howey-Forman investment contract
test but did tighten the interpretation of "money or its
equivalent" to require the contribution of definable and tangible
consideration, which the Court pointed out would include goods
and services.39  Continuing to follow Forman, the Court
demanded that to find an investment contract, there must be a
substantial expectation of profit.
Id. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RISK CAPITAL TEST
A. Silver Hills
Not all courts have agreed with the restrictive federal defini-
tion of investment contract.10 Under both Howey and Forman,
regardless of the risks involved in the contribution of capital, the
securities acts are applicable only if the investor expects some
profit from the investment. The federal courts have imposed the
36. See Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. 111. 1976),
aff'd, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
37. 439 U.S. at 560.
38. Id. at 561-62.
39. Id. at 560 n.12.
40. See, e.g., Lowery v. Ford Hill Inv. Co., 192 Colo. 125, 130 n.1, 556 P.2d 1201,
1205 n.1 (1976). See also Hunt, Madame El Khadem, The Ninth Circuit and The Risk
Capital Approach, 57 OR. L. Rxv. 3, 6-7 (1978).
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expectation of profit element even though the definitions of
security under the securities acts do not expressly require a
promise of profit to the suppliers of capital. By taking a broader
view of the securities acts, however, it may-be argued that the
purpose behind the acts is to give those who risk their capital a
reasonable chance of meeting their investment objectives regard-
less of whether profit is the primary motivation."
Against this background the California Supreme Court, in
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski," was the first to articulate
a new test for defining security. The promoters of a country club
bought property with a small down payment, intending later to
develop a club and operate it for a profit. To finance both the
purchase and development of the property, the promoters sold
memberships. Members were entitled to use the facilities but
received no right to share in the income or assets of the club.
Despite the lack of a Howey-type expectation of profit, Justice
Traynor held that the memberships constituted securities within
the meaning of the California Corporate Securities Act.
In approach, Silver Hills supplanted the Howey requirement
of expectation of profit with a requirement of expectation of any
significant and valuable benefit one might be induced to
purchase. The Silver Hills benefit approach conflicts with the
Howey decision and the later Forman decision, wherein the
United States Supreme Court took the conservative view that
profit is usually limited to pecuniary return such as capital
appreciation or participation in earnings.4" Although the Silver
Hills court held that the purchase of a membership constituted
an investment of risk capital and thus a security, the court failed
adequately to define risk capital," deciding the case more on pol-
icy grounds than upon specific statutory definitions of security.
The opinion does not clearly indicate whether the risk capital
test was based on an expansion of the investment contract
approach or on something entirely new. Outside of California,
the case was not widely relied upon for many years.
41. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1961).
42. Id.
43. 421 U.S. at 588 (plaintiffs in Forman had urged the Court to adopt the Silver
Hills benefit analysis and accept as "profit" the savings allowed by government subsidy
of purchase price, rent, and taxes). See Comment, The Definition of a Security Under the
California Corporate Securities Law of 1968: The Risk Capital Test, 6 PAC. L.J. 683, 696
(1975).
44. See note 7 supra.
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B. Hawaii Market
In the effort to establish a definition of risk capital, the
Hawaii Supreme Court in 1971 picked up where Silver Hills left
off. In State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,' 5 a corporation
sought capital to open a retail store through the sale of founder
memberships. The purchaser of a membership received an appli-
ance, the wholesale value of which was only a small portion of
the invested capital, and a promise of future income from partic-
ipation in various promotional schemes to be conducted by the
corporation. The court in Hawaii Market based its risk capital
approach on a test proposed by Professor Ronald J. Coffey, a
noted writer in securities law." Coffey's test, expanding the con-
cept used in California, requires not only a demonstration of risk
to initial value, but also a showing that the offeror induced
investment through promises of a valuable benefit. This benefit,
according to Coffey, must accrue over and above initial contrib-
uted value and must be a result of the operation of an enterprise
over which the offeree exercises no control. Impressed by the
Hawaii Market decision, the SEC immediately adopted it in a
release as consistent with Howey.
4 7
C. Other States
The western states have been strong proponents of the risk
capital theory. In addition to California and Hawaii, Oregon and
Idaho have adopted a risk capital .test by judicial decision. In
State v. Consumer Business Systems, Inc.," the Oregon Court of
45. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
46. See Coffey, supra note 1.
47. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 78,446 (Nov. 30, 1971). See Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 186, [1971-1978
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,200 (March 1975); Wis. AD. CODE §
1.02(6)(b) (1979).
48. 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971). The court declared a franchise arrangement
to be an investment contract under the Oregon Securities Act in spite of its conclusion
that the scheme could not meet the Howey requirement of profits resulting solely from
the efforts of others. The court relied on Silver Hills and adopted the risk capital test. Id.
at 25-26, 482 P.2d at 552-54. In so doing, the Oregon court apparently restricted the
application of the test to the initial capital furnished, something which was not required
by the California court in Silver Hills. This distinction allowed the Oregon court to con-
clude in a subsequent case that travel club memberships were not investment contracts
under the Oregon securities law. Jet Set Travel Club v. Corporation Comm'r, 21 Or. App.
362, 535 P.2d 109 (1975). Recent Oregon decisions have made it clear that the risk capital
test is a part of Oregon law. Fulsaas v. Janitorial Ent., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,453 (D. Or. 1978); Pratt v. Kross, 276 Or. 483, 490, 555 P.2d 765, 769 (1976); Marshall
v. Harris, 276 Or. 447, 452, 555 P.2d 756, 759 (1976); Bergquist v. International Realty,
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Appeals selected the risk capital test as an alternative to the
Howey interpretation of investment contract. Consumer Busi-
ness Systems was selling franchise agreements that did not meet
the requirement of the Howey test that the investor's profits
must result solely from the efforts of others. The court, finding a
security under a risk capital analysis, held that use of the Howey
test should not foreclose other methods of analysis when war-
ranted. In a later case, Jet Set Travel Club v. Corporation Com-
missioner,49 the Oregon Court of Appeals circumscribed the risk
capital test, applying it only to unproven enterprises. 0 The court
indicated that because Jet Set Travel Club had been in opera-
tion more than a year and because members in other states real-
ized benefits prior to any sales in Oregon, the risk capital test
could not be used.
Idaho, in a reported trial court opinion, also has adopted the
risk capital test. In State ex. rel Park v. Glenn W Turner Enter-
prises, Inc.,5" the Fourth Judicial District Court of Idaho agreed
that while the risk capital tests enunciated in Hawaii Market
and Consumer Business Systems went a long way in the right
direction, these cases were incorrectly construed to limit risk
capital to "initial capital," capital invested in newly formed
enterprises. Rather, the Idaho court held that risk capital could
apply to schemes to raise capital for any existing but unproven
business.
Alaska also currently adheres to the risk capital theory. In
1975, Alaska adopted the risk capital concept by statute," drawing
its definitional language from Professor Joseph C. Long, 3 who also
drafted the Oklahoma risk capital statute.54 It is perhaps
significant to note that the Alaska statutory language is nearly
Ltd., 272 Or. 416, 424 nn.6 & 7, 537 P.2d 553, 558 nn.6 & 7 (1975).
49. 21 Or. App. 362, 535 P.2d 109 (1975). But see 50 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 20 [1954-1971
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 70,750 (Aug. 1967).
50. Nothing, however, in the Silver Hills opinion or in risk capital analysis compels
this conclusion; the test may be applied to any undercapitalized operating enterprise
seeking to finance the development of new products or markets. See Spencer, Private
Placement of Securities in Oregon: The Legal Framework, 53 OR. L. REV. 131, 139-42
(1974). One federal district court has suggested that the test should apply only to situa-
tions involving exceptionally high risk. See Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324
F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970), modified and aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
51. State ex rel. Park v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,023 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1972).
52. Act of July 2, 1975, ch. 217, 1975 Alaska Sess. Laws (codified at ALASKA STAT. §
45.55.130(12) (Supp. 1979)).
53. See Long, supra note 4.
54. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(P) (Supp. 1977): "'Security' means any: ... (P)
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identical to that in the new Washington statute.55 The Alaska
definition has been discussed in State v. Vacation Internationale,
Ltd. , an administrative proceeding in which the Department of
Commerce and Economic Development established a four-part
test for determining whether an offering qualifies under the Alaska
risk capital security definition. 7 The Alaska proceeding is
noteworthy because it did not limit the application of risk capital
to initial capital.
D. Federal Decisions in the Ninth Circuit
The federal courts, as would be expected, have been slow to
acknowledge the risk capital approach. Contrary to most other
federal courts, however, those in the Ninth Circuit have gradu-
ally embraced it. As early as 1965, in SEC v. Latta, a federal
district court may have employed risk capital analysis, although
the facts of the case also fit within the framework of the Howey
test. Federal courts largely ignored the risk capital test for the
next nine years, while the courts of Oregon,59 Hawaii,60 and
Idaho6 adopted the risk capital approach as enunciated by the
California court in Silver Hills.
In 1973, a federal district court, in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
investment of money or money's worth including goods furnished and/or services per-
formed in the risk capital of a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the inves-
tor where the investor has no direct control over the investment or policy decision of the
venture. ... See In re Royal Am. Chinchilla, Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,330 (Okla. Dep't of Sec. 1977).
55. "[I]nvestment of money or money's worth including goods furnished or services
performed in the risk capital of a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the
investor where the investor has no direct control over the investment or policy decision of
the venture ...... ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (Supp. 1979).
56. [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,294 (Alaska Dep't of
Com. & Econ. Dev. 1976). Michigan and Oklahoma reached similar results concerning
Vacation Internationale's program in those states. See In re Vacation Internationale,
Ltd., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,287 (Mich. Dep't of
Com. 1976); Okla. Dep't of Sec. Op. Letter, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 39,726 (Oct. 28,
1975). See also In re Fed. Resources Corp., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,476 (Alaska
Dep't of Com. & Econ. Dev. 1978).
57. State v. Vacation Internationale, Ltd., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 71,294 (Alaska Dep't of Com. & Econ. Dev. 1976).
58. 250 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 356 F.2d 103 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966). See Coffey, supra note 1, at 382.
59. See note 48 supra.
60. State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
61. State ex rel. Park v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,023 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1972).
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Enterprises, Inc.,2 finally adopted the risk capital test. On the
heels of this decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in El
Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp.,63 appeared to apply the risk
capital approach to a case involving money borrowed for invest-
ment purposes. The court construed an assignable note and
pledged collateral as an investment contract.6 ' Giving credibility
to El Khadem, the United States Supreme Court in Forman
indicated its belief that El Khadem indeed applied a risk capital
test.15
Since the Forman holding, several Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals cases concerning the definition of a security have indi-
cated that El Khadem was intended to adopt the risk capital
approach.66 In a 1976 case, Great Western Bank & Trust v.
Kotz,17 the Ninth Circuit continued to utilize risk capital analy-
sis, citing El Khadem.18 In Kotz, the court relied heavily upon
the economic realities test discussed in Forman and listed six
factors it felt should be examined to determine whether a prom-
issory note is an investment contract: (1) time, (2) collateraliza-
tion, (3) form of the obligation, (4) circumstances of issuance, (5)
relation between the amount borrowed and the size of the bor-
rower's business, and (6) contemplated use of the funds. 9 The
court held that unsecured notes given to the bank were not
securities. Kotz was followed in 1977 by United California Bank
v. THC Financial Corp.,'70 wherein Judge Wright reiterated the
Ninth Circuit's approach to the risk capital test as developed in
Kotz and El Khadem. In analyzing the promissory notes being
sold, the court focused on the expertise of the purchasing
financial institution and the commercial character of the trans-
action and found no risk capital." In a more recent case, Amfac
Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc.," the court
expressed that the Ninth Circuit risk capital test is derived from
62. 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Or. 1972).
63. 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
64. Id.
65. 421 U.S. at 857 n.26.
66. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976); Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz,
532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976); Parker v. Davis Oil Co., 524 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1975). See
generally Hunt, supra note 40, at 16-27.
67. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
68. Id. at 1256-59.
69. Id.
70. United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
71. Id. See Hunt, supra note 40, at 21-28.
72. 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978).
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both the Howey and Forman holdings of the United States
Supreme Court. The Amfac court stated that the ultimate
inquiry was whether Amfac contributed risk capital subject to
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. The court
found, however, that the secured, short-term note in Amfac was
not a security.
The Ninth Circuit cases indicate that, where profit motive is
present, the courts should not confine analysis to a classical
application of the Howey case. The Ninth Circuit risk capital
standard analyzes the underlying risks and economic realities
within the framework of the Joiner, Howey, and Forman cases.
In not finding a security under risk capital analysis in the Kotz,
United California Bank, and Amfac decisions, the court has
shown merely that banks and financial institutions are not
favored in suits under the securities laws because they already
have adequate means to protect themselves. Results might well
be different in actions brought by individual investors. With
regard to the putative distinction between initial and ongoing
risk capital, in spite of Oregon's limitation in Jet Set Travel, the
Ninth Circuit significantly has not been inclined' to. limit risk
capital to initial capital.13
IV. THE INVESTMENT CONTRACT AND RISK CAPITAL TESTS IN
WASHINGTON
A. McClellan v. Sundholm
"Investment contract" has been a subcategory of the defini-
tion of security since Washington adopted the Uniform Securi-
ties Act in 1959.11 Not until 1969 was the term construed, how-
ever, and then only by a federal court. 5 The Washington
Supreme Court first confronted the investment contract theory
in McClellan v. Sundholm.76 The appeal in McClellan centered
on the liability of a sales agent in a silver purchase scheme. The
salesman, acting on behalf of Universal Trade Company of Port-
73. Amfac was decided after Jet Set Travel, yet the court showed no inclination to
endorse the Oregon court's limitations relating to initial capital.
74. Ch. 282, § 60(11), 1959 Wash. Laws 1350 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE §
21.20.005(11) (1979)). See UNIFORM SECURrrIEs AcT § 401(e) (amended 1958).
75. Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 639-41 (9th Cir. 1969).
The Chapman opinion is criticized in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473,
484 n.15 (5th Cir. 1974), and probably is superseded by SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See State v. Williams, 17
Wash. App. 368, 563 P.2d 1270 (1977).
76. 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574 P.2d 371 (1978).
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land, Oregon, convinced the Washington plaintiff to invest in
bars of silver bullion. In conjunction with the purchase, the com-
pany offered services that included selection, storage, and resale
of silver bars and apparently some ongoing advice on the silver
market. Not only was the Oregon company in poor financial con-
dition at the time of sale of the silver, but the principal of the
company also diverted the purchaser's funds to land speculation
and personal use. Although silver was delivered to other custom-
ers, none was delivered to the plaintiff.
The trial court reasoned that the transaction was the sale of
a security solely because of the diversion of funds for which the
sales agent was not responsible. Disagreeing, the Washington
Supreme Court found that the sale of unidentified silver bullion
was an investment contract within the Washington State Securi-
ties Act and held the sales agent liable. The court listed three
tests for considering a purported investment contract: (1) the
Howey test, (2) the risk capital test, and (3) the Minnesota
test.7 The court chose the federal test based on Howey.75
In applying the traditional Howey formulation, the Wash-
ington court faced several difficulties. First, the court had to
decide the "common enterprise" issue 7 because there appeared
to be no common enterprise among the company's purchasers of
silver.80 The court followed the Glenn W Turner' decision, how-
ever, which held that an "interdependence of fortunes" between
the seller and the purchaser was all that was necessary to satisfy
the common enterprise requirement.82 Second, a literal reading
77. Id. at 531-32, 574 P.2d at 373. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1948),
the Court defined an investment contract as an investment of money in a common enter-
prise where the investor expects to reap profits from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party. Id. at 298. See notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text. In contrast to Howey,
the Minnesota test asks whether the contract in issue operates to place capital in a man-
ner intended to secure a profit. State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177
N.W. 937 (1920).
78. 89 Wash. 2d at 532, 574 P.2d at 373.
79. Id., 574 P.2d at 374. For a discussion of the common enterprise issue, see text
accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
80. See, e.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (individual discretionary commodity accounts lack common-
ality necessary to meet common enterprise requirement). In fact, in the McClellan case
funds apparently were sufficiently pooled and commingled to satisfy the narrow Milnarik
reading of the Howey case. See also Lowery v. Ford Hill Inv. Co., 192 Colo. 125, 556 P.2d
1201 (1976) (control by common agent satisfies the common enterprise test).
81. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
82. Id. at 482 n.7 (citing Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285
F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961)).
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of Howey requires that all profit expectation come "solely from
the efforts of others." Although the sales agent made representa-
tions about services, the purchaser sought delivery of the bullion
and presumably would.be responsible for its further management
and disposition. In this event, some of the efforts to gain a profit
would involve the purchaser, thereby precluding a security under
Howey.13 Again following the functional approach of the Glenn
W. Turner case, however, the court found no involvement of the
purchaser in "those essential managerial efforts which affect the
failure or success of the enterprise."'"
At this point, the court was stretching for a just result.
Although the purchase of a commodity does not preclude the
existence of a security, 5 all elements of an investment contract
must be present. The facts only indicated the incidental offer of
services in conjunction with the sale of a commodity for which
the purchaser sought delivery.88 There was no guarantee of prof-
its, and no repurchase or resale agreement was tendered. The
court found a security only on the basis that the plaintiff was
offered a commodity and additional services.87 It may be ques-
tioned whether in McClellan the economic benefits of silver
ownership derived from- the managerial efforts of any person
other than the purchaser and the vagaries of the silver market,
and further whether the services offered amounted to those"essential managerial efforts" upon which a silver purchaser
83. Literally, Howey would require the expectation of profits to come solely from the
efforts of others. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), sublessees
would be expected to sell their interests in order to derive a profit. This effort would
have precluded the Joiner Court from finding a security under a strict application of the
Howey test.
84. 474 F.2d at 482.
85. See, e.g., Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977).
86. Bare commodities are not usually regarded as securities because they have inher-
ent value and can be immediately possessed. King Commodity Co. v. State, 508 S.W.2d
439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); 3 H."BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW
§ 2.16[11 (1978 rev.) ("The sale of commodity futures does not involve the sale of
securities; commodity trading is subject to regulation outside of the federal securities
laws."); 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD-SEC RULE 10b-5 § 4.6(410) (1977); Long,
Definition of a Security, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96, 100 n.21 (1974).
87. Under similar facts the SEC has given "no action" letters. See SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5552, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,037
(Dec. 26, 1974) (granting "no action" position to certain gold offerings based in part on
finding that: 1) the economic benefits to the gold purchaser would not be derived from
the managerial efforts of the seller, 2) the purchaser would pay full value and purchases
would not be made on margin, 3) depository arrangements would be limited to storage
and documentary right of purchasers to take possession, and 4) there would be no obliga-
tion on the part of the seller to repurchase or resell gold).
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must rely to make a profit in the silver market."
On the facts presented, the court could well have applied
the risk capital test and been on firmer ground. At the time of
sale, the company had no specific silver ingots in inventory or
identified with any particular investor's contract, and delivery
was to be made in the future.8 Never was there sufficient bullion
on hand to satisfy all outstanding silver purchase contracts;
deliveries were made only to those who complained. The company
was probably insolvent at the time of the sale and in fact became
so one month later. 0 In effect, the purchaser contributed risk
capital that allowed the enterprise to keep treading water.'
Whether figuring significantly in the transaction or not, the
incidental representations regarding the services of selection,
storage, resale, and advice were not necessary to find a security.
The very nature of the transaction placed the silver purchaser in
the position of financing the company and its principal's
endeavors without any management control on the part of the
purchaser.92
The Washington court also failed to take note of United
Housing Foundation v. Forman.3 As previously discussed," For-
man reformulated the Howey test by dropping from its definition
the "common enterprise" and "solely" elements discussed in the
McClellan case." This shift by the United States Supreme Court
signals a less literal approach, suggesting more than ever that
88. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5552, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 80,037 (Dec. 26, 1974). Loss states the case in this manner:
The line is drawn, however, where neither the element of a common enterprise
nor the element of reliance on the efforts of another is present. For example, no
"investment contract" is involved when a person invests in real estate, with the
hope perhaps of earning a profit as the result of a general increase in values
current with the development of the neighborhood, as long as he does not do so
as part of an enterprise whereby it is expressly or impliedly understood that the
property will be developed or operated by others.
1 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 491-92. See also 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 86, at
§ 2.19[3].
89. Brief for Appellant at 8, McClellan v. Sundholm, 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574 P.2d 371
(1978).
90. Id. at 9.
91. See SEC v. Western Pac. Gold & Silver Exch. Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,064 (D. Nev. 1975).
92. For a discussion of the legislative definition of risk capital, see text accompany-
ing notes 110-212 infra.
93. United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
94. See text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
95. See United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852; McClellan v.
Sundholm, 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574 P.2d 371 (1978).
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the underlying economic realities of a transaction will prevail. 6
In substance, McClellan is at least as much a risk capital case as
it is a Howey case.
B. Sauve v. K.C., Inc.
The second opportunity for the Washington Supreme Court
to interpret the definition of a security appeared in Sauve v.
K.C., Inc. 7 The defendant, K.C., Inc., was in the business of
leasing household appliances with purchase options. To raise
funds to purchase appliances for leasing, an agent of the corpora-
tion borrowed at least $250,000 from approximately forty-five
persons. The plaintiff, interested in obtaining an interest rate
greater than her savings bank offered, loaned the corporation
$15,120 for three years at twelve percent per annum. Contempo-
raneously with the loan, the corporation gave the plaintiff
eighty-four conditional sale contracts representing security inter-
ests in the newly leased appliances purchased with her loan
funds. Upon default, the plaintiff sued the insolvent corporation,
the officers, and the unregistered sales agent. The trial court
failed to find fraud but concluded that the arrangement consti-
tuted a collateral trust,98 an enumerated subclass of security
under the Securities Act of Washington. The court of appeals
affirmed but found instead a security under the risk capital
test." The supreme court affirmed on different grounds, holding
that the arrangements for borrowing money constituted an
investment contract. In so deciding, the court rejected the risk
capital approach, stating in dictum: "Howey, not 'risk capital,'
is the rule in Washington." 10
The court, relying upon McClellan v. Sundholm,'0' once
more applied the Howey investment contract formula. In sup-
port of its Howey analysis the court cited El Khadem v. Equity
Securities Corp.,'"1 a case that turns on risk capital analysis.
0 3
96. See Coffey, supra note 1, at 367-83.
97. 91 Wash. 2d 698, 591 P.2d 1207 (1979).
98. Sauve v. K.C., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 659, 664, 577 P.2d 599, 603 (1978), aff'd on
other grounds, 91 Wash. 2d 698, 591 P.2d 1207 (1979).
99. Id. at 666, 577 P.2d at 604. For prior risk capital cases in Washington, see note
111 infra.
100. 91 Wash. 2d at 702, 591 P.2d at 1209.
101. 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574 P.2d 371 (1978). See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
102. 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
103. In United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24 (1975), the
United States Supreme Court cited El Khadem as representative of the "risk capital"
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Under the third element of the Howey test, the court encoun-tered the issue of whether a promised fixed interest rate consti-
tuted an expected "profit." Finding that it did, the court again
cited El Khadem as precedent but ignored the United Housing
Foundation v. Forman holding that profits meant capital appre-
ciation, a participation in earnings,' 0 or income yielded by
investment.1,o
Although the court did not follow the risk capital test, itnonetheless took the opportunity to define risk capital: "The'risk capital' approach used by the court of appeals requires only
that risk capital be supplied with a reasonable expectation of avaluable benefit but without the right to control the enter-prise." 06 In a mild contradiction, the Washington Supreme
Court cited Glenn W Turner as support for risk capital.'07 Thecourt had cited this case extensively in McClellan to support its
application of the Howey investment contract test.'
On the facts of the Sauve decision it is easy to agree that therisk capital test was not needed because the plaintiff sought andwas promised a high interest rate. Nonetheless, the court shouldnot have ruled out the test. Plaintiff contributed funds to a thin-
ly capitalized corporation: funds that were necessary to purchase
and lease appliances and carry out the scheme.'" In effect, plain-
tiff invested risk capital to finance an appliance leasing ventureover which she had no management control. As an alternative to
Howey, the risk capital test also would have fit well to protect
the unwary investor.
C. Legislative Definition of Risk Capital
Even before the appellate court opinion in Sauve,"10 many
thought the risk capital test to be the law of Washington, espe-
approach. See Hunt, supra note 40.
104. 421 U.S. at 852.
105. Id. at 855. See State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 651, 485 P.2d105, 110 (1971) (cited in Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corps., 37 Cal. App. 3d
330, 334, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (1974)).
106. Sauve v. K.C., Inc., 91 Wash. 2d at 702, 591 P.2d at 1211.107. Id. The court's citation of Glenn W Turner as support for risk capital is justi-fied because the district court relied in part upon that approach. See SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Ents., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Or. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
108. McClellan v. Sundholm, 89 Wash. 2d at 532-33, 574 P.2d at 374.
109. Record at 72-76, Sauve v. K.C., Inc., No. 787-564 (Wash. Super. Ct. Thurston
County March 8, 1976).
110. 19 Wash. App. 659, 577 P.2d 599 (1978).
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cially after its application in two earlier superior court deci-
sions."' Careful securities practitioners followed risk capital
analysis in evaluating whether a proposal fell within the securi-
ties laws, utilizing one or more of the leading cases in other juris-
dictions."' The opinion of the court of appeals in Sauve"
3
seemed to confirm the trend. The Washington Supreme Court's
dictum in the Sauve case foreclosed as a practical matter further
application of the risk capital approach."'
In reaction to the court's opinion, the forty-sixth legislature
adopted a risk capital definition"5 in the form of an amendment
reading as follows: " 'Security' means any . . . investment of
money or other consideration in the risk capital of a venture with
the expectation of some valuable benefit to the investor where
the investor does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control over the managerial decisions of the venture
. "I" This amendment to the definition of security is in
addition to the existing term, "investment contract.""' 7 With this
amendment, courts and practitioners face the difficulty of inter-
111. Lundquist v. American Campgrounds, Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,196 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1973); Ackerson v. Jet Set Travel Club,
No. 772120 (Wash. Super. Ct. King County 1974). See Hunt, supra note 40, at 5.
112. See, e.g., Letter from Mike Liles, Jr., of Bogle & Gates, Attorneys-at-Law, to
Financial Institutions Committee, Washington State House of Representatives (April 9,
1979) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review) (concerning risk capital
definition in SB 2314, currently codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12) (1979)).
113. Sauve v. K.C., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 659, 577 P.2d 599 (1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 91 Wash. 2d 698, 591 P.2d 1207 (1979).
114. 91 Wash. 2d 698, 702, 591 P.2d 1207, 1209 (1979).
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12) (1979).
116. Id. The language of the amendment was derived largely from definitions in
ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (1961), OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(P) (Supp. 1977), and State
v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
117. WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.005(12) (1979). Notwithstanding the adoption of a risk
capital test, the term "investment contract" is expected to keep its present scope of
interpretation, expanding or contracting in sympathy with the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions, especially those of the federal courts. In general, the Washington cases have fol-
lowed federal law. Sauve v. K.C., Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 698, 591 P.2d 1207 (1979); McClellan
v. Sundholm, 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574 P.2d 371 (1978); State v. Williams, 17 Wash. App.
368, 563 P.2d 1270 (1977). A number of jurisdictions have had difficulty in determining
the construction to be placed upon "investment contract" in light of the divergence of
the risk capital analysis from the Howey formula. See State v. Investors Sec. Corp., 297
Minn. 1, 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Syss., Inc., 5
Or. App. 294, 482 P.2d 549 (1971). Compare Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55
Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961) with Tomei v. Fairline Feeding Corp.,
67 Cal. App. 3d 394, 137 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1977) and Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of
Corps., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974). The problem concerns whether the
risk capital approach is an expansion of the Howey test or an altogether different analyti-
cal approach to, finding the existence of a security.
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preting and applying a new test. To facilitate this interpretation,
this section explores the historical and analytical background of
each of the elements of the new statutory risk capital definition.
1. Investment
Inherent in the definition of "security" is the investment
concept. Investment may be defined in a number of ways but
generally constitutes the laying out of money to purchase some
kind of property or opportunity. More narrowly, investment
involves the contribution of capital to a business venture, usu-
ally with the expectation of income or profits." 8 Because these
definitions are rather broad, there must be some refinement of
the investment concept so that not all connotations of invest-
ment are included.19
As a rule of construction, however, investment must be
given a broad interpretation 2 0 to ensure that the securities laws
reach "novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they
appear to be."'' A manageable analysis of the investment con-
cept, consequently, must be confined to objective facts and char-
acteristics.' Fundamentally, the risk capital approach embodies
the view that substance controls over form. 23 Neither the fact
that a particular transaction does not appear to involve a secur-
ity nor the fact that a purchaser does not intend to make an
investment in the narrow sense precludes risk capital treatment.
In many cases the purchaser has no idea he is making an invest-
118. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2054 (1971).
119. For example, a person who says his car or personal residence is a good invest-
ment probably uses the term more broadly than is contemplated by the securities laws.
120. "[Riemedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes."
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
121. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
122. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 238-40, 249; Long, supra note 86, at
109. But see United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). "We decide only
that the type of transaction before us, in which the purchasers were interested in acquir-
ing housing rather than making an investment for profit, is not within the scope of the
federal securities laws." Id. at 859-60. This narrow holding necessitates searching for the
purchaser's intent in determining the existence of a security. Unfortunately, such a sub-
jective determination will depend upon facts difficult to ascertain.
123. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 1; Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1; Long, supra
note 86. United States Supreme Court cases have consistently examined the underlying
economic realities of a transaction. See United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 848 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65
(1959); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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ment and, thus, the purchaser's subjective intent has little rele-
vance." 4 The most significant feature is the purchaser's contribu-
tion of funds to the economic capital of a venture-this is the
essence of an investment.'7 In risk capital analysis, as contrasted
with other securities applications, risk and the contemplated use
to which funds will be put determine an investment. 21
In attempting to ascertain the limits of the investment con-
cept, courts and commentators have focused on the apparent
distinction between investments and commercial transactions. "7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has paid special attention to
this dichotomy when dealing with notes.12 8 For example, in Great
Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz,'2 the circuit court examined six
factors in determining whether a transaction was commercial or
for investment: (1) time to maturity, (2) collateralization, (3)
form of the obligation, (4) circumstances of issuance, (5) rela-
tionship between the amount borrowed and size of borrower's
business and, perhaps most important, (6) contemplated use of
the funds. 130
The commercial-investment distinction is not universally
accepted. In Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross& Co.,' 31 the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly,
rejected the commercial-investment dichotomy, suggesting
instead that all notes be treated as securities "unless the context
otherwise requires.' ' 32 The court described six types of note
transactions in which the context might lead to a finding that no
124. See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961); Jet Set Travel Club v. Corporation Comm'r, 21 Or. App. 362, 535 P.2d
109 (1975); Long, supra note 86, at 109 n.63. A purchaser's intent to contribute risk capi-
tal would be relevant but not essential to a court's finding that a security exists.
125. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 236; Long, supra note 86, at 109.
126. See El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1974); Hannan &
Thomas, supra note 1, at 244-49; Long, supra note 86, at 109. See also Coffey, supra note
1.
127. See, e.g., Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976); C.N.S.
Ents. v. G. & G. Ents., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546
(10th Cir. 1974); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City
Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are Not Always
Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763 (1975); Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always
Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAw. 861 (1974); Long, supra note 86, at 110.
128. See United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977); Great
W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
129. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
130. Id. at 1257-58.
131. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
132. Id. at 1131-39. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 776 (1976). See also
WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005 (1979).
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security was involved: (1) a note delivered in a consumer financ-ing, (2) a note secured by a home mortgage, (3) a short-term
note secured by a lien or business assets, (4) a note evidencing a
character loan to a bank customer, (5) a short-term note secured
by accounts receivable, and (6) a note on an open account in the
ordinary course of business.'I Notes without the above charac-
teristics and having a maturity exceeding nine months would be
presumed securities.1u The choice of the term "investment" sug-
gests that the commercial-investment dichotomy may be appli-
cable in the interpretation of the legislative definition of risk
capital. The test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Kotz may
prove helpful in determining the presence of a risk capital
investment. In those cases, however, where all other elements of
the risk capital test are present-a contribution to the risk capi-
tal in a venture with an expectation of some valuable benefitwithout management control-the reasoning of Judge Friendly is
superior. A risk capital security should exist unless the context
involves one of Judge Friendly's six exceptions, or similar cir-
cumstances, and overwhelmingly indicates that the transaction
was for commercial purposes. If all elements of the risk capital
test are present, the presumption clearly should be in favor of
investment and, therefore, of finding a security.
2. Money or Other Consideration
Money plays the dominant role as consideration in the offeror sale of securities. But in defining a security, is money the only
consideration that should be recognized? The language of the
Howey test obviously contemplated money, ordinarily cash.3 5
Most courts have not limited themselves to a literal interpreta-
tion of "money" and, consistent with investment intent, have
allowed other valuable consideration. 13 In many transactions
133. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d at 1138.
134. Id.
135. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
136. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 n.12 (1979);Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1976) (promissory note); El Khadem v.Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974)
(securities and cash pledged); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 768-69 (5th Cir.
1974) (services and property in formation of organization); SEC v. Glenn W. TurnerEnts., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (money and ser-vices); Cordas v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Or. 1979) (rentalpayments, lease deposits, and obligation to make lease improvements); SEC v. Addison,
194 F. Supp. 709, 722 (N.D. Tex. 1961); Murphy v. Dare To Be Great, Inc., [1971-1978
Transfer Binderl BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,053, at 67,276 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1972); In
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money is not invested or is not the final investment in the enter-
prise.'3 7 Securities often are purchased by rendering services or
committing property; such consideration consequently should
not be overlooked in defining a security. To some extent, the dif-
ficulty of recognizing nonpecuniary investment consideration
under the Howey test led to the formulation of the risk capital
test.138
The statutory definition leaves no doubt that money is not
the only ingredient in the risk capital recipe. The legislature
expressly recognized nonpecuniary investment when it used the
terminology, "money or other consideration.''3  The use of the
broad term "consideration" suggests that a "contracts" test may
be applied: any consideration that would be sufficient to create a
contract would also be sufficient to find a security. Perhaps this
is overbroad,4"0 but the type of consideration must be weighed
against the background of other elements of the risk capital
definition.
re Continental Mktg. Assoc., Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
1 71,016 at 67,179 (Ind. Sec'y of State 1969); State v. Davis, 131 N.W.2d 730, 733 (N.D.
1964) (exchange of stock for notes); Coffey, supra note 1, at 380; Long, supra note 4, at
174-75; Long, supra note 86, at r14; Newton, What Is a Security?: A Critical Analysis, 48
Miss. L.J. 167, 174 (1977).
137. Typically, money is paid to acquire property that is then immediately recom-
mitted or redelivered to the seller or promoter. In these cases the purchaser often takes
title but the property is never possessed by or delivered to the purchaser. See, e.g., SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). For situations involving the sale and lease back
of property, see Huberman v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal.
1972); Financial Analytics Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,498 (SEC Ruling Aug. 15, 1973) (cited in Long, supra note 86, at 99); Rice v. Bogart,
272 Il1. App. 292 (1933); Bergquist v. International Realty, Ltd., 272 Or. 416, 537 P.2d
553 (1975). For a situation involving the sale and redelivery of property, see People v.
Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1972) (cattle care contract). See also
Long, supra note 86, at 115-16 nn.93-95. Analytically, these types of transactions may be
viewed as investments of either money or property in the promoter's enterprise. Coffey,
supra note 1, at 386-90; Long, supra note 86, at 116. For situations involving services
rendered in exchange for securities, see SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex.
1961); Coffey, supra note 1, at 380; Newton, supra note 136, at 174. Organizational and
promotional stock would fall within this category even though the promoter would not
normally expect benefits through the managerial efforts of others. See WASH. AD. CODE §
460-IOA-050(1) (1977).
138. Long, supra note 86, at 116-17, 125.
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12) (1979) (emphasis added).
140. Professor Long's definition reads as follows: "A security is the investment of
money or money's worth including goods furnished and/or services performed in the risk
capital of a venture . . . ." Long, supra note 86, at 128 (emphasis added).
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3. Risk Capital
The term "risk capital" is found in the leading case, Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,"' but without adequate defini-
tion." 2  Most jurisdictions employing the risk capital test,
whether by statute, rule, or decisional law, have avoided defining
risk capital, leaving it to the facts of each case to demonstrate
the term."' Although the Washington legislative definition does
not expressly define risk capital, two fundamental aspects are
involved: (1) the risk of value furnished,' and (2) the financing
of a venture." 5
a. Risk to Initial Investment
The risk of loss of the initial value contributed to a venture
is often an essential attribute of a security.' Ordinarily, courts
141. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
142.
We have here nothing like the ordinary sale of a right to use existing facilities.
Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a business
for profit. The purchaser's risk is not lessened merely because the interest he
purchases is labelled a membership. Only because he risks his capital along
with other purchasers can there be any chance that the benefits of club mem-
bership will materialize.
Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
The Silver Hills opinion emphasizes the lack of existing club facilities and the use of
the purchaser's funds to develop a business. Because the club facilities were not complete
and operating, a membership would not achieve real value until the facilities were availa-
ble for use. The purchaser's objectives could not be realized immediately upon purchase
but were subject to many financing and construction contingencies. See text accompany-
ing notes 40-44 supra.
143. For jurisdictions employing the risk capital test by statute, see, for example,
ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (Supp. 1979) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20) (P) (Supp.
1977). For jurisdictions employing the test by decisional law, see, for example, Amfac
Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978); Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); State v. Hawaii
Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); Jet Set Travel Club v. Corporation
Comm'r, 21 Or. App. 362, 535 P.2d 109 (1975); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business
Syss., Inc., 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971).
144. See generally Coffey, supra note 1, at 381-96. Benefit of the bargain may also be
a fundamental aspect in the risk capital definition but is not often discussed.
145. See generally Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 244-49.
146. See El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). See also Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th
Cir. 1976). Professor Coffey cites the following language from SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 349 (1943), to support his assertion that the risk of loss of initial
value is an essential attribute of a security:
It is clear that an economic interest in this [enterprise] . . . was what brought
into being the instruments [evi'dencing real property interests] that defendants
were selling and gave to the instruments most of their value and all of their
lure. The trading in these [interests] . . . had all the evils inherent in the
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find this risk capital component when the purchaser's funds or
property are placed at risk in a venture.'47 The type of risk con-
templated involves nothing more than a substantial risk of
loss. 48 For the definition to apply, the purchaser's contribution
need not be lost; it need only in some manner be subject to the
risk of either being totally or partially diminished. 4 ' Therefore,
as a basic observation, risk capital is not defined as a "risky"
transaction or limited to speculative undertakings 150 but applies
whenever a substantial part of the risk of loss is shifted to the
purchaser, whether he knows it or not. 51 On the other hand,
when the purchaser is fully secured and may realistically avoid
loss upon liquidation of the security, risk capital arguably may
not have been contributed.'
Risk to value furnished, of course, must be analyzed in rela-
tion to other elements of the test. Generally there will be repre-
sentations which lead to the expectation of a valuable benefit.
Relying on these representations, the purchaser parts with funds
or property which are then subjected over a substantial period of
time to risks not within the purchaser's control. At least two
types of risks are apparent: (1) that the funds contributed will
be dissipated in the venture and (2i that the purchaser will have
no managment control over the funds or the venture.' The risk
in not having control over an investment may be treated as sepa-
securities transactions which it was the aim of the Securities Act to end.
Coffey, supra note 1, at 381 (emphasis by Coffey). '
147. See Coffey, supra note 1, at 380-81; Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 244-45.
See also Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
148. Coffey, supra note 1, at 381-84. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d
1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
149. See SEC v. Latta, 250 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal.), afl'd per curiam, 356 F.2d 103
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966) (discussed in Coffey, supra note 1, at
382 & n.72). See also El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
150. See Coffey, supra note 1, at 403. But see Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak,
Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970), modified and aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir.
1972). See also Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976); Motel Co.
v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1965).
151. Coffey, supra note 1, at 381-96. See, e.g., SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (both
discussed in Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 226-28, 246-47).
152. Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corps., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr.
387 (1974); cf. Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (1976) (collateral-
ization). See also El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 900 (1974); Sauve v. K.C., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 659, 577 P.2d 599 (1978), aff'd on
other grounds, 91 Wash. 2d 698, 591 P.2d 1207 (1979).
153. See text accompanying notes 195-212 infra.
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rate from the venture risk, which is of special concern here. Typ-ically, such a risk will arise when funds are committed to anundercapitalized venture.' 5 ' It is not possible to describe all the
circumstances in which the venture risk is manifest. Professor
Coffey, however, has set forth five distinct risk capital catego-ries, '5 all of which may be applicable under the Washington leg-
islative definition.
b. Financing the Venture
The second often-present feature of the risk capital concept
is the use of the investor's money to finance the venture. In this
respect, risk capital is akin to venture capital in that it serves as
a functional substitute for conventional debt or equity financ-
ing. ' In instances such as those presented in Silver Hills, risk
capital amounts to nothing more than hidden financing.157 Thepromoters of the country club might have chosen to finance
through banks or other institutions, or employed a stock ordebenture offering to meet capital needs, or placed their own
capital at risk. Instead, they offered club memberships to the
public to finance the promised benefits.ss Because the public
154. Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1974) (semble). But seeMr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), modified and
aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972); 49 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 124 (1967).
155. Coffey's risk categories are essentially:
(1) Intangible proprietary interest in the enterprise: risk of repayment upon
termination plus share of profits and losses;
(2) Intangible claim against the enterprise: creditor's risk of receiving repay-
ment and interest;
(3) Tangible or intangible property: purchaser's risk who retains specificownership but recommits property to use or employment by the enterprise;
(4) Tangible or intangible property: purchaser risks original value paid in rec-
ognition of the yet-unrealized success of an enterprise; no legal relationship
with enterprise is necessary;
(5) Property with fair market value less than initial value: purchaser's risk of
conditional right to receive payments.
Coffey, supra note 1, at 384-85.
156. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.Rptr. 186 (1961); Coffey, supra note 1, at 399; Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 244-45. See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 3890, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 1041(Jan. 25, 1958) (trading stamps, theater tickets, gift certificates, and the like, may be
securities if used for corporate financing).
157. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 246 n.110.
158. Commenting on the scheme in Silver Hills, Justice Traynor said:
Hence the act is as clearly applicable to the sale of promotional membershipsin the present case as it would be had the purchasers expected their return in
some familiar form as dividends. Properly so, for otherwise it could too easily
be vitiated by inventive substitutes for conventional means of raising risk
t
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often will not recognize that such memberships are a type of
financing, the protection of the securities laws is greatly needed.
Consequently, courts using the risk capital test subject this
financing method to the same rigors required of traditional debt
or equity offerings.5 9 Requiring compliance with the securities
laws will mean that the antifraud and registration provisions of
the acts (demanding disclosure of all material facts) will aid and
protect the otherwise unwary public.
Risk capital financing most often entails expenditures for
facilities, capital items, or enterprise formation. On this basis,
some courts distinguish between raising funds for capital items
and operating expenses.6 0 In many instances this distinction
may apply. If, however, an entity could not operate without rais-
ing capital to meet current needs, the risk capital test might still
apply.' In these instances, the investor's money would be doing
something more than maintaining the current financial position
of the venture. Even though funds are raised only to cover current
operating expenses, risk capital may still be apposite if the
represented benefits are not immediately available or fall far short
of the value contributed.
Of course, not every funding of an enterprise falls within the
accepted scope of the test. As with almost all investments, the
purchaser's funds become a portion of an enterprise's capital.62
Both the source and use of all funds fueling the enterprise are
very important. The key question is whether the purchaser's
funds are significant in providing or maintaining the expected
benefits. If a substantial portion of the capital raised comes from
purchasers who cannot realize benefits within a reasonably short
period of time, risk capital financing may well be present.' 3 But
capital.
55 Cal. 2d at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
159. This was the contention of the petitioner in Silver Hills:
The commissioner contends not only that a membership in the club is a benefi-
cial interest in the title to property and therefore a security within the literal
language of subdivision (a) of section 25008 but also that the purchase of such
an interest is attended by the very risks the corporate securities act was
designed to minimize.
Id. at 813, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
160. Cordas v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 780 (D. Or. 1979). See
Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1976); McClure v. First
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974).
161. Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
162. See id. at 1258; Cordas v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 780 (D. Or.
1979). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 3890, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1041
(Jan. 25, 1958).
163. See, e.g., State v. Consumer Business Syss., 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971).
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if the profits or benefits expected may be provided from the
existing operating revenues of the enterprise, courts probably
would not view the further contribution of funds as risk capital.
In that instance, while funds advanced may be "at risk" in the
enterprise, the funds are not essential to finance the expected
benefits. At least one court has observed that risk capital must
constitute the primary source of capital of the enterprise to
afford application of the test.' The percentage of risk capital
necessary to trigger the definition should depend, however, upon
the facts of each case. In summary, the risk capital concept pro-
vides only that, as a matter of policy, any promotional venture
using other people's money at their risk upon a promise of some
valuable benefit should be treated as a security to protect the
people's money." 5
4. Venture
There is a great deal of similarity between "venture" as
used by the legislature and "common enterprise" as articulated
in the Howey opinion."' 6 Cases subsequent to Howey have not
uniformly defined a common enterprise.'67 In the Ninth Circuit,
an undertaking between an investor and-a promoter satisfies the
common enterprise definition. 8 The Third'69 and Seventh Cir-
cuits, 170 on the other hand, require a relationship between inves-
tors, which is most often found with a pooling of investor
funds. 7' The better view appears to be that adopted by the
Ninth Circuit.' It should not matter whether one or several
See also Jaciewicki V. Gordarl Assocs., 132 Ga. App. 888, 209 S.E.2d 693 (1974); Jet Set
Travel Club v. Corporation Comm'r, 21 Or. App. 362, 535 P.2d 109 (1975).
164. Cordas v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 780 (D. Or. 1979).
165. Coffey, supra note 1, at 401-03.
166. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
167. Compare Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (horizontal privity) with SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474
F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (vertical privity).
168. El-Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 900 (1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).
169. Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), afj'd
mem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1974).
170. See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik
v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
171. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977) (pooling of funds or a
pro rata distribution of profits required).
172. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973). See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Glen-
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investors are involved-the focus of the inquiry is on the rela-
tionship between investor and promoter. This must be the point
of reference because the need for the protection of the securities
laws arises not from the relationship between investors but from
that between investor and promoter."' For similar reasons,"venture" should not be interpreted as limited to a single legal
entity or as dependent upon the finding of a legal entity.'
The United States Supreme Court has not yet reviewed the
common enterprise issue although, in United Housing Founda-
tion v. Forman,'75 the Court referred to the relationship between
the investor and the promoter as the "common venture."'7 6 The
use of the term "venture" by the Court may imply greater
flexibility in the required relationship between promoter and
investor. As previously discussed, in making this change the
Court may have leaned toward the majority view. Nevertheless,
in an effort to avoid this problem, the legislative definition
dropped "common" from the description of venture, thereby
emphasizing the receipt of capital by the promoter rather than
other ties with the investor or between investors. This would
seem to follow closely the approach of the Ninth Circuit in SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,'77 wherein the court
focused upon whether "the fortunes of the investor are interwo-
ven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those
seeking the investment or of third parties.' 78 The Glenn W. Thr-
ner decision seems to be an adequate interpretation; accordingly,
Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 495 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); Andrews v. Blue,
489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d
414 (8th Cir. 1974).
173. Of course, the number of investors or the pooling of funds may play a part in
determining the applicability of any exemption from registration. See SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
174. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 237; Long, supra note 4, at 163-64.
175. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
176. Id. at 852.
177. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See also SEC v. Kos-
cot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
178. 474 F.2d at 482 n.7 (citing Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC,
285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961)); accord, SEC v. Continen-
tal Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974). In McClellan v. Sundholm, 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574
P.2d 372 (1978), the court stated: "Under the federal test, a common enterprise need not
be a common fund. The term denotes rather an interdependence of fortunes, a depen-
dence by one party for his profit on the success of some other party in performing his part
of the venture." Id. at 532, 574 P.2d at 373-74; see Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387
F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1967) ("The more critical factor is the nature of the investor's
participation in the enterprise.").
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no further definition need be given "venture" under the legisla-
tive test.
5. Expectation of Some Valuable Benefit
The investor's expectation merely of "some valuable bene-
fit" as opposed to a "profit" amounts to a substantial departure
from federal law and is the single most controversial element of
the risk capital formulation.'79 This sharply contrasts with the
Howey test, which requires an expectation of "profits."'' 0 Under
the federal cases, the term "profits" was beset with ambiguity,",
especially prior to United Housing Foundation v. Forman.5 2 In
Forman the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of "profits."
The Court indicated that a profit expectation may arise through
capital appreciation, through participation in earnings, or in the
form of income to be yielded by investment, but ventured noth-
ing further.8 3 Many forms of compensation may amount to prof-
its consistent with the Forman case, including "dividends, inter-
est, commissions, bonuses, or similar remuneration.' 8 Profits
179. See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 86, at § 2.19[111]-[131; Coffey, supra note 1,
at 403; Faust, "What Is a Security?" How Elastic Is the Definition?, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 219
(1975); Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 545; Newton, supra note 136, at 195-98.
Although the Court in United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), pur-
ported to leave the risk capital question open, the strong language of the opinion leaves
little doubt that profit expectation will be retained in some form by the Court.
Most of the federal decisions dealing with risk capital have involved the control and
management features of franchises, pyramid sales arrangements, or notes. But see SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5211, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,446 (Nov. 30, 1971) (adopting State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485
P.2d 105 (1971)). Decisions involving notes include United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin'l Corp.,
557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977), and Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252.(9th
Cir. 1976). Federal decisions involving franchises include Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498
F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974), Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), and Mr.
Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), modified and
aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). Finally, federal decisions dealing with pyramid sales
arrangements include SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga.
1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1974) and SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 348 F. Supp.
766 (D. Or. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
180. "By profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting from the
development of the initial investment, as in Joiner, . . . or a participation in earnings
resulting from the use of investors' funds, as in Tcherepnin v. Knight .... " United
Hous. Foundation v. Forman,- 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). See International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
181. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). See
also Coffey, supra note 1, at 375.
182. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
183. Id. at 852. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
184. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971);
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could take the form of stock dividends or stock in trade."s Under
both the Howey and Forman tests, however, a security may not
be found to exist if a purchaser's motive is not profit, but rather
a "desire to use or consume the item purchased."'""
The lack of expected profits was a central feature in the Sil-
ver Hills decision,8 7 in which the California Supreme Court
abandoned the need for the promise of profits in favor of the
promise of any valuable benefit, tangible or intangible. Follow-
ing Silver Hills, courts,"' administrative tribunals,"8' and state
legislatures,"10 generally recognizing the limitations of Howey and
Forman, moved away from the strict "profits" test, either giving
a more expansive interpretation to profits"' or discarding it alto-
gether in favor of the broader term, "benefits.""' The Washing-
Long, supra note 86, at 117.
185. Long, supra note 86, at 117.
186. United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53. As the Court appears
to point out, transactions in which a purchaser seeks both consumption and investment
may still constitute securities. Id. at 853 n.17. With regard to the consumer-investment
distinction, see Newton, supra note 136, at 181-83. But see Coffey, supra note 1, at 380-81
(" [Tihe question is still whether the transaction exhibits the 'economic realities' of a
security.")
187.
It bears noting that the act extends even to transactions where capital is placed
without expectation of any material benefits. Thus from its exemption of secur-
ities of certain nonprofit companies the act specifically excepts "notes, bonds,
debentures, or other evidences of indebtedness whether interest bearing or
not." (Italics added.) Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capi-
tal the test of what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is
to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their
objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their
capital in one form or another.
55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
188. See, e.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105
(1971); Jet Set Travel Club v. Corporation Comm'r, 21 Or. App. 362, 535 P.2d 109 (1975);
State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Syss., Inc., 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971).
189. See, e.g., State v. Vacation Internationale, Ltd., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder]
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,294 (Alaska Dep't of Com. & Econ. Dev. 1976); In re Spa
Athletic Club, Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,136
(Alaska Dep't of Com. & Econ. Dev. 1974); In re Consumer Cos. of America, 3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 71,444 (Ky. Dep't of Banking & Sec. 1978). In re Vacation Internatio-
nale, Ltd., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,287 (Mich. Dep't of
Com. 1976).
190. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit 71, § 2(20)
(P) (Supp. 1977).
191. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ents., 474 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105
(1971). See also Long, supra note 86, at 117.
. 192. See, e.g., In re Vacation Internationale, Ltd., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,287 (Mich. Dep't of Com. 1976).
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ton Legislature followed the latter course. Because "valuable
benefit" has no precise meaning, the courts are left with the
task of interpreting the term in order to protect the public.'93
Courts will probably recognize, in addition to conventional"profits," the use of club facilities or time-sharing arrangements
and other intangibles as valuable benefits." '
6. Control Over the Managerial Decisions of the Venture
Lack of control over the use of invested funds is thought to
be an essential element of a security. 1 5 This carries out the gen-
eral purpose of the securities laws: protection of persons who are
not ordinarily in a position to protect themselves. 9 ' Conversely,
those in control presumably will protect themselves, eliminating
the need for the protection of the securities laws.'97 To imple-
ment the policy of investor protection, the Howey definition
demands that expected profits result "solely from the efforts of
others." This phraseology, particularly the word "solely," has
received sharp criticism. 9 " Some courts have taken a literal
approach, requiring all efforts involving the enterprise to be con-
ducted by the promoters. Indeed, if investors engaged in any
efforts at all, these courts did not find a security.'99 More
recently, the focus of the courts and commentators has shifted
from the quantity to the quality of investor participation. This
approach may be called "management" analysis. Following the
Glenn W. Turner case in the Ninth Circuit, courts have evalu-
193. See Hunt, supra note 40, at 29-30.
194. For example, two Washington superior court cases have recognized intangibles
as valuable benefits. Ackerson v. Jet Set Travel, Inc., No. 772120 (Wash. Super. Ct. King
County 1974) (air travel club membership); Lundquist v. American Campgrounds, Inc.,
[1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,196 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1973)
(camp club membership).
195. "People who put their money in other people's hands are usually powerless to
control what is done with the money. Under these circumstances it is appropriate for the
promoter to disclose the risks of the enterprise, so that the investor can make an
informed judgment." Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 249. See also Coffey, supra
note 1, at 396-98.
196. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 249.
197. "The danger of fraud being practiced upon the buyer is considerably reduced
when his initial investment is subjected to the risks of an enterprise with which he is
familiar at the time of the transaction and over which he exercises management control."
Coffey, supra note 1, at 396.
198. See, e.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105
(1971); Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 249-53; Long, supra note 86, at 119-22. See
also Newton, supra note 136, at 185-92; Securities Regulation, supra note 7, at 835-41.
199. See Long, supra note 86, at 119.
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ated who is represented as performing the "essential manage-
rial" duties to determine the control issue." The "essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the en-
terprise" are those the promoter or third party must conduct
and the investor may not engage in.20' This language from the
Glenn W Turner opinion appears to have persuaded the United
States Supreme Court in Forman to recast the Howey invest-
ment contract definition by dropping the word "solely" and
instead requiring that profits come from the "entrepreneurial or
managerial" efforts of others. 202
The statutory definition of risk capital avoids the "solely
through the efforts of others" issue by adopting the position that
the investor's lack of 'the right to exercise control over manage-
ment is of critical importance. Ordinarily courts would find the
right of control in documents or in express representations relat-
ing to the transaction. In the case of shares of stock or member-
ships, the articles and bylaws will dictate the purchaser's rights.
Control cannot be determined, however, without careful review
of all facts and circumstances because in many investment con-
tract cases, express or implied representations override expressly
granted rights.20 3 In the past this area has been difficult for the
courts.2 " A number of decisions regarding joint ventures and
partnerships have explored the right-to-control issue.2 15 In some
cases, the mere right to control was sufficient to lead the court to
hold that a security was not present.106 Other cases have empha-
200. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1977); Hector v.
Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976). See Long, supra note 86, at 122.
201. 474 F.2d at 482-83.
202. 421 U.S. at 852-57. This appears to be Forman's effect even though the
Supreme Court specifically stated that it expressed no view as to the Glenn W Turner
holding. Id. at 852 n.16. But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551 (1979).
203. See, e.g., Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir.
1974) ("In determining whether the plaintiffs' contributions were nominal or significant,
the issue was not what efforts, in fact, were required of them. Rather, it is what efforts
the plaintiffs were reasonably led to believe were required of them at the time they
entered into the contract."). See also SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
353 (1943).
204. See Hirsch v. du Pont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Long, supra
note 86, at 119.
205. See, e.g., Hirsch v. du Pont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Long, Partner-
ship, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REv. 581
(1972); Newton, supra note 136, at 188.
206. See, e.g., Hirsch v. du Pont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); New York
Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill.
App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965).
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sized an effective right to control, 07 and still another viewpoint
recommends that there be an actual exercise of the right." "
Beyond the right to control, the test appears to be whether the
investor expects to play an active, knowledgeable role in
management.09 With the addition of the words "actual" and"practical," the Washington version '10 ensures the protection of
the securities laws to the investor who does not receive a
meaningful right to control his contribution of funds.2 1' Left open
to question is whether control is absent when a promoter offers a
realistic right to control but an investor never exercises the right.
The interpretations to be placed on the words "practical" and"'actual" remain unclear. Practical control may be interpreted to
mean majority control or merely a voice in management.2 12
Actual control seems to point to some means by which the inves-
tor can protect his investment as distinguished from a mere
paper right. Undoubtedly, the courts will ultimately have to
resolve such issues.
207. See, e.g., United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Mr. Steak,
Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 1972); Hirsch v. du Pont, 396
F. Supp. 1214, 1222-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); State ex rel. Fisher v. World Mkt. Centers, Inc.,
[1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,034 (Okla. Dist. Ct. 1972);
Long, supra note 86, at 122; Newton, supra note 136, at 185-92.
208. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 78,446 (Nov. 30, 1971); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877,
[1967] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,462 (Aug. 8, 1967). See also SEC v. Glenn W. Tur-
ner Ents., 474 F.2d 476, 480-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
209. See Coffey, supra note 1, at 396.
210. The Washington definitional language, "the investor does not receive the right
to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the venture,"
WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12) (1979), was borrowed almost verbatim from the fourth
paragraph of the test set down in State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485
P.2d 105 (1971), which in turn substantially adopted Professor Coffey's definition, see
Coffey, supra note 1.
211. With regard to control, Professor Coffey states as follows:
Although the joint control concept has been rejected in some quarters, it seems
sound in principle and has been included as a component of the author's pro-
posed formula for identifying a security. However, the exception should be
applied only when the buyer's position truly reduces the possibility of fraud
and gives him the power to affect the risk to his initial investment. At the time
of the transaction, the buyer should possess both knowledge of the risk enter-
prise and the power to influence the course of its future operations. It seems
highly questionable whether the joint-control theor' should govern where the
buyer assumes a management role after the purported security transaction but
has had no knowledge of the risk enterprise prior thereto.
Coffey, supra note 1, at 397-98 (footnote omitted).
212. See Hirsch v. du Pont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also WASH. REv.
CODE § 25.04.180(5) (1979).
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V. CONCLUSION
The addition of the risk capital definition to Washington's
securities law213 will expand regulation to many transactions that
in the past were excluded. Although its full application is unfore-
seeable, the risk capital definition should apply to financing
arrangements in the formation of clubs, associations, and cooper-
atives .2 1  Practitioners must be keenly aware that ventures not
traditionally defined within Washington's securities regulations
may now fall under the risk capital definition of a security."'
Designed in part to protect the public from fraud, securities
regulations traditionally have been applied to investment finan-
cing involving such security subclasses as stocks, bonds, and
debentures. The risk capital definition in Washington now
extends the policy of public protection underlying securities laws
to transactions equally susceptible to fraudulent conduct. How
courts may react to this new definition greatly depends on their
perception of the need to protect the public from providing capital
financing to ventures that are without access to conventional
213. The Securities Act of Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 21.20 (1979), creates civil
regulatory liability under §§ 21.20.010, .020, and .350, express private civil liability under §
21.20.430, and implied private civil liability under § 21.20.400. See Comment, Unlawful
Securities Transactions and Scienter: An Emasculating Requirement, 1 U. PUGET SD. L.
REV. 366 (1978); Comment, Securities Fraud Under the Blue Sky of Washington, 53 WASH.
L. REV. 279 (1978). See also Parker, Attorney Liability Under the Securities Laws After
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 10 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 521 (1977). Because of Washington's new
risk capital definition, practitioners must be sure to apprise clients of the increased risks of
regulatory enforcement in both public and private investor financing schemes. One
measure of client protection is to request a "no action" letter or interpretive opinion from
the Washington State Securities Division of the Department of Licensing. Such a measure
will either indicate that the client's venture comes within state securities regulation or that
the licensing division later will take no action, assuming the venture comports with the
spirit of the original request.
214. See, e.g., 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 86, § 2.19[12] at 2-97 (1979 rev.);
Comment, County Club Memberships: Are They "Securities" Under the Federal Securities
Laws?, 26 KAN. L. REV. 439 (1978).
215. Time-sharing arrangements and lifetime care contracts may fall within the risk
capital test. See, e.g., State v. Vacation Internationale, Ltd., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder]
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,294 (Alaska Dep't of Com. & Econ. Dev. 1976) (time-share
interests held securities). Offers and sales of facilities or services prior to construction or
rendition will often involve risk capital. 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 86, § 2.19[12] at
2-97 (1979 rev.). As an example, if condominium units are offered before construction and
funds raised through this offer will become an integral part of construction financing, the
offer may constitute a risk capital security. Yet if the funds were to be placed in escrow
and were not relied upon to finance construction, arguably no risk capital would have been
invested. Additionally, clubs or activities that finance themselves through continued
sales of memberships should not rule out the test's application. Coffey, supra note 1, at
401-03. See also Comment, supra note 214.
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financing. "' If convinced that today's public warrants economic
protection in the face of an everchanging pattern of financing
schemes, courts must rigorously apply the risk capital definition
to discourage financial fraud.
216. The risk capital approach is not limited to public offerings but would apply toall offerings, whether registered or exempt. Although Professor Coffey suggests that his
test be so limited, the jurisdictions adopting such an approach, including Washington,
have not done so. See Coffey, supra note 1, at 408-11.
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